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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

UTAH COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
CASE NO.
JUDY BAXTER, SQUAW PEAK, INC.,
TOM STUBBS, FRANK HORTON and
DIANA HORTON,

17039

Defendant-Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from an action initiated by Utah
County pursuant to the County's Zoning Ordinance and the
Utah Enabling Statutes to obtain an injunction against the
continued commercial use of a single-family residence which
is owned by the defendant-appellant, and which propertv
is situated in the Critical Environmental I Zone in Utah
County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Fourth District Court in and for Utah County,
State of Utah, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge Presiding

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and sitting without a jury, issued an injunction prohibiting
the further commercial use of appellant's single-family
residence which use is not permitted in the Critical Environmental I Zone of Utah County.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the District Court's
decision and findings which granted plaintiff a permanent
injunction prohibiting the defendant

from further commercial

use of the single-family dwelling on the property in question
until such time as the zone is changed permitting expanded
commercial use, or until such time as it is otherwise permitted by law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There existed two structures on the subject property:
(1)

a single-family residence constructed in March of 1953

(T.R. 31) and (2)

the Riverbend Lounge, a commercial establisl

ment.
While the property in question is presently in the
Critical Environmental I Zone, it previously had been in the
Watershed Conservation Zone (W.C.I.).
within a Commercial Zone.

Said property never was

Land within the Critical Environ-

mental Zone has functioned historically as a primary watershed
for much of the irrigation and culinary water supply for the
Utah Valley area.

Experience has shown this watershed area to
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be environmentally fragile;
importance to the County.

its preservation is of critical
4-5-S(A) of "The 1976 Revised

Zoning Ordinance of Utah County, Utah."
Both the single-family residence and the Riverbend Lounge
were separate non-conforming uses in the Critical Environmental
Zone upon adoption.

(T.R. 31, 35).

On January 17, 1977, the

business known as the Riverbend Lounge was destroyed by fire
(T. R.

34, 42) •

,Prior to the fire, appellant-defendant had

resided in the residence on the subject property.
A building permit was issued to defendants

(T.R. 42).

for the construction

of a steak house to replace the Lounge which had burned down.
(T.R. 25).

Also, on or about November 15, 1978, defendant-

appellant made application to remodel the single-family residence on the premises.

Defendant-appellant indicated on the

building permit that the existing use of the parcel was "single
family" and that the intended use of the parcel was "single
family".

(Plaintiff's Exhibit "l").

Defendant-appellant

provided all the information for the permit while a county
employee prepared the form (T.R. 43).
With her application, defendant-appellant submitted a
site plan prepared by herself expressing what was to be done
with the property (T.R. 43),

(plaintiff's Exhibit "3").

On

the site plan, defendant-appellant has identified a kitchen,
a living room, bedrooms, closets and other rooms common to a
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residence.

Both the building permit application and the

site plan contain no indication whatsoever that the subject
property was to be used other than for a single-family residen
Since the permit and the site plan were in order, a permit
issued.
At the time of application, defendant-appellant anticipat
spending $3,500 to remodel (Plaintiff's Exhibit "l").

She

estimated at trial that she actually spent between $12,000
and $15,000 (T.R. 47).
After completion of the improvements to the home, defendant-appellant made application for a business license for sai
structure.

The same was denied.

Defendant-appellant never did have a business license to
operate commercially from the single-family residence (T.R. 44
The Riverbend Lounge, which had burned down, was totally
reconstructed into a new facility, the Squaw Peak Steakhouse.
It was completed and opened for business on December 31, 1979.
Upon completion of the steak house, defendant-appellant
intended to transfer back into that new facility.
51).

tt.R. 50 and

Defendant-appellant knew that her commercial use of the

home was, at best, temporary.

(T.R. 50).

Defendant-appellant

never intended to have two commercial businesses on the
property.

(T.R. 51).

Because of partnership problems, not

because of any misleading on the part of Utah County or the
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Building or Zoning Department, defendant-appellant was unable
to transfer her business to the new facility and, therefore,
operated a commercial business in the single-family residence.
(T.R. 51).
Plaintiff brought this action because defendant-appellant
changed the use of a single-family residence to a business, all
contrary to "The 1976 Revised Zoning Ordinance of Utah County,
Utah"; because a single-family residence and a commercial
business had expanded into two businesses in the Critical Environmental Zone.

"The 1976 Revised Zoning Ordinance of Utah

County, Utah" provides:
A nonconforming use of a building or
lot shall not be changed to another nonconforming
use whatsoever. Changes in use shall not be made,
except to a conforming use.
4-l-8(D).
ARGUMENT
I

THE DEFENDANT IS WITHOUT STANDING IN
EQUITY TO PRAY FOR ESTOPPEL.
The frequently cited maxim that "he who comes into
equity must come with clean hands" is an ancient and favorite
precept of the Equity Court.

See Salt Lake County v. Kartchner.

552 P.2d 136, 139 (Utah, 1976).

The same principle is expresse<

in the language that "he who has done inequity shall not have
equity".

The principle announced thereby is recognized as bein

a fundamental principle of equity jurisprudence.

National F.
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Insurance Company v. Thompson, 281 U.S. 331, 74 L. Ed. 881,
50

s.

Ct. 288.

The underlying theory inherent in the clean

hands doctrine is that equity has for its purpose the dispensi
of unalloyed justice and that, as Lord Chief Justice Wilmot
observed, "No polluted hand shall touch the pure fountain of
justice".

See Rock v. Matthews, 35

w.

Va. 531, 14 S.E. 137.

It is equally well settled that one's misconduct or lack
of conduct need not necessarily have been of such a nature as
be punishable as a crime or as to.justify legal proceeding of
any character.

Any willful act concerning the cause of action

which rightly can be said to

~ransgress

equitable standards of

conduct is sufficient cause for the invocation of the maxim.
27 Am. Jur.2d Equity, Section 138.

The "clean hands" doctrine

takes on even greater significance when the suit in equity
concerns a public interest.

27 Am. Jur.2d Equity, Section 136

at Page 668 states:
. . . [W]here a suit in equity concerns
the public interest as well as the private interest
of the litigant, the doctrine that he who comes
into equity must come with clean hands assumes a
greater significance since it not only prevents a
wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his transgressions, but_ also averts_an injury to the
public.
See also Precision Instrument Mfg. Company
v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Company, 324 U.S.
806, 89 L. Ed. 1381, 65 S. Ct. 993.
In the instant case, defendant would have this Court esto1
the County from exercising its police powers.

To grant such

relief would infer that the defendant has sought equity with
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"clean hands".

Such an inference is in direct conflict with

the evidence presented and is contrary to the findings of the
trial Court.

In support thereof, the plaintiff would specifi-

cally draw this Court's attention to the following:
First, the building permit was issued for the remodelling
of a "single-family residence" with an estimated cost of $3,500.
(See plaintiff's Exhibit "l").

However, in fact, between

$12,000 and $15,000 were expended.

Ms. Baxter provided plaintif·

with the $3,500 estimate and executed the permit bearing that
figure.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit "l").

(T.R. 67).

Just above de-

fendant's. signature is the following agreement:
I agree to comply with all the county and
state building laws and ordinances, that the
representations in this application for a building
permit are true and accurate, andauy misinterpretation or error herein are the sole responsibility of
the applicant, and shall in no way incur or accrue
liability or obligation to Utah County, its officers
or agents.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit "l") .
Secondly, Ms. Baxter, on the face of the building permit,
designated the intended use of the structure as "single-family
residence"

(Plaintiff's Exhibit "l").

Thirdly, Ms. Baxter submitted a site plan, on which she
described rooms common to a single-family residence and not a
commercial establishment.

She testified that the "living room"

in said site plan now has tables and chairs and a portable bar.
The large "closet" in said site plan is now a large walk-in
cooler.

It became very clear in trial that the representations

of defendant on the building permit and site plan were not
"true and accurate".
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-7Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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Certainly the weight of the evidence supported the
Court's finding:
That the defendant, Judy Baxter, had no
agreement with plaintiff allowing commercial use
of the single-family dwelling.
In light of the above, it stands to reason that the
estoppel argument can best be applied against the defendant;
she cannot now claim the building permit was issued for a
commercial business when all her designations on the requisite
documents are for a "single-family residence".

Therefore,

the rules of equity do not assist her in her claim.
II
EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE COURT
FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS SOUGHT
EQUITY NITH CLEAN HANDS, THEN ON THE MERITS
OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED, THE COUNTY CANNOT
BE ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING A PERMANENT INJUNCTION BASED ON A VALID EXERCISE OF ITS POLICE
POWER.
The defendant alleges that the County should be estopped
from seeking a permanent injunction.

Defendant

bases her

allegation on the notion that "a party seeking an injunction
must show a clear legal or equitable right and a well-grounded
fear of immediate invasion of that right."
Further, defendant contends that the Court erred by faili1
to balance the conveniences prior to granting the injunction
in favor of plaintiff.

-8-
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Defendant's contention and reasoning is faulty in several
respects because we are dealing with zoning laws.

The doctrine

of estoppel is not generally applicable against a government
body.

Only under "exceptional circumstances" have a few juris-

dictions allowed estoppel to be applied.

See State, etc. v.

St. Charles City Board of Adjustment, 553 S.W.2d 729 (Miss. 1977)
In Utah, the above-stated exception allowing estoppel against
a municipal entity, was addressed by the Court in Salt Lake
County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah, 1976), wherein
the Court stated:
Estoppel, waiver or laches ordinarily do not
constitute a defence to a suit for injunctive
relief against alleged violations of zoning laws,
unless the circumstances are exceptional.
Zoning
ordinances are governmental acts which rest upon
the police power and as to violations thereof any
inducements, reliances, negligence of enforcement,
or like factors are merely aggravations of the
violation rather than excuses or justifications
therefor.
[Emphasis added].
In Kartchner, supra, the County was estopped because it
was notuniformly enforcing the law.
present matter now before this Court.

Such is not the case in thE
As the Court in State,

etc. v. St. Charles City Board of Adjustment, supra, admonished
"The doctrine of estoppel is not generally applicable against
a governmental body and if applied, it is done so only in
exceptional circumstances and with great caution."
added].

[Emphasis

553 S.W.2d at 726.

-9-
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Defendant has further asserted that Utah County is
estopped by the acts of its agents.

In response to such a

claim, first and foremost, defendant-appellant admitted that
she was not misled by Utah County and its employees.

(T.R. 51

The Court, supported by the evidence at trial, found no misleading by respondent.

Thus, an essential element of an equit.

estoppel is missing.
Second, the structure, itself, is a home and does not
violate the zoning laws; it is only the commercial use that is
proscribed.
As a matter of law, estoppel may not_be used as a defense
by one who acted fraudulently, or in bad faith, or with knowle1
BA McQuillin, Municipal Corporations

(3rd Ed. Rev.), Sec. 25.3·

P. 517; Utah County v. Kenneth J. Young, et al., Utah, 615 P.21
1265 (1980).
Even if it had been determined that County had misled
Ms. Baxter, estoppel is not always available.

~T~e

principle

well established that a public or governmental corporation sucl
as a municipal corporation is not estopped by the acts of its
officers when they exceed their powers.

The rule is that per-

sons dealing with such officers must, at their peril, ascertai1
the scope of their authority."

3 McQuillan, Municipal Corpora·

tions, Third Edition, Section 12.126a at Page 534.
The above languaqe was cited with favor in Dansie v.
Murray City, 560 P.2d 1123 (Utah, 1977).

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The underlying reason for the rule as cited above and
applied by the Court in Dansie, was best stated by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Alexander Company v. Owatonna, 24 N.W. 2d 244
(Minn. 1946), wherein it stated:
A contrary .rule would lead to chaos in
municipal affairs.
If the doctrine of estoppel
could be invoked in such situations, municipalities would repeatedly find themselves bound by
the unauthorized acts of their officers and
agents possessing only limited authority. Experience has shown the wisdom of the prevailing
rule and persons dealing with municipal officers
and agents are bound by constructive notice of
the law and public records with respect to the
powers and functions of such officers or agents.
Defendant has relied upon a mountain of case law to drive
home a non-meritorious point and in so doing has ignored the
fact that estoppel is inapplicable, except under exceptional
circumstances.
Further, it is unreasonable to think that a municipality
must weigh and consider the "conveniences" before exercising
legitimate police powers in enforcing its zoning laws.

That

theory is not a "well established and fundamental rule of
law" in the field of zoning enforcement.
III
THB FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE, B~CAUSE
OF HIS ADVANTAGED POSITION, OUGET NOT BE
DISTURBED UNLESS THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY
PREPONDERATES TO THE CONTRARY.
Defendant-appellant alleges that "at no

time during the

trial was any evidence elicited or put forth by plaintiff-
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respondent to in any way reflect that the plaintiff had
suffered irreparable injury or harm"o
forgotten plaintiff's first

Evidently, counsel has

witness~

As its first witness, the Chief of the Food Section in
the City-County Health Department was called.

In that capacity

he performed an inspection of the commercial establishment in
the single-family residence, resulting in a finding of health,
safety, and sanitary deficiencies (T.R. 21).
When plaintiff attempted to inquire of the Health Officer
concerning those deficiencies, counsel for defendant strenuously objecfed, claiming that "nothing there is relevant to
this proceeding".

(T. R. 21) .

It is Utah County's position that health deficiencies in
a food establishment are a detriment to Utah County and its
residents and can cause irreparable harm.

Certainly the Court

can reasonably infer that health and safety deficiencies will
affect Utah County residents.
Counsel, upon objecting to the evidence and claiming it
to be irrelevant, ought to be estopped from claiming on appeal
that it is totally necessary, requisite and relevant and that
the lack of said information forms the basis for

reversal.

Those positions are patently inconsistent.
On Appeal, this Court will not disturb the action of the
trial Court unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the
contrary, or the trial Court has abused its discretion, or

-12-
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misapplied principles of law.

Eastman v. Eastman, Utah,

558 P.2d 514 (1976); Watson v. Watson, Utah, 561 P.2d 1072

(1977); and Pope v. Pope, Utah, 589 P.2d 752 (1978).
In a recent Utah case, Tanner v. Baadsgaard, Utah,
612 P.2d 345 (1980), this Court stated its well-established
rule:
Due to the prerogatives and advantaged
position of the trial judge, we indulge considerable deference to his findings.
Where
the evidence is in dispute, we assume that he
believed that which is favorable to his findings,
and we do not disturb them unless it clearly
preponderates to the contrary. The Court relied
upon sound Utah case law: Timpanogos Highlands,
Inc. v. Harper, Utah, 544 P.2d 481 (1975);
Pagano v. Walker, Utah,539 P.2d 452 (1975);
McBride v. McBride, Utah,581 P.2d 997 (1978);
Kier v. Condrack, 25 Utah 2d 139, 478 P.2d 327
(1970).
Based upon the record, certainly the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in holding that the County was not
estopped from seeking injunctive relief.

The findings in

the instant case are supported by the evidence and should not
be disturbed.
IV
THE DOCTRINE OF "LACHES" IS BARRED.
Defendant-appellant contends that Utah County delayed in
asserting its rights, being guilty of laches.

While it is true

that several months passed before a suit was filed, Utah County
was working with Ms. Baxter's counsel from May, 1979, attemptin~
to resolve this matter.

Certainly Utah County should not be
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faulted for attempting to resolve this matter short of litigation, even though that policy may cause some delay in the
filing of a law suit, if or when it becomes necessarye
It appears that defendant-appellant has delayed in
asserting the defense of laches.
affirmative defense.

Such defense is clearly an

Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure provides:
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a
party shall set forth affirmatively . . . laches
and any other matter constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense.
o

•• ,

Defendant-appellant never raised the defense of laches
in her answer, nor was any claim or argument made at trial.
Clearly it is untimely to raise the defense of laches for the
first time at appellate review.

The argument should be barred

Defendant's argument is also marred by the fact that no
vested right to violate a zoning ordinance can be acquired by
a continuing violation.

Lockard v. Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453

202 P.2d 38, 7 A.L.R.2d 990, cert. den., 337 U.S. 939, 93
L. Ed. 1744, 69 S. Ct. 1516.

Mere non-action by a municipalit:

does not constitute acquiescence.
Ill. App.2d 75, 262 N.E.2d 485.

Rockford v. Sallee, 129
The doctrine of laches does

not ordinarily apply to a municipality whose duty it is to
enforce its own zoning regulations.

82 Am. Jur.2d §253.

-14-
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CONCLUSION
The defendant-appellant has gone far afield in her
arguments.

The trial judge characterized this case as a

zoning case and narrowed the issues.

It was not meant to be

a review of the denial of Ms. Baxter's beer license.

Nothing

in the pleadings refers to a beer license.
The granting or denial of a beer license is within the
exclusive domain of the Board of Utah County Commissioners.
Said Board has never been joined as a party to this action.
It should be emphasized that Iva Snell, a County Building and
Zoning Officer, contrary to statements found in the defendantappellant' s Brief, has no authority whatsoever to deny or
grant approval of a beer license.
Many of the defendant-appellant's arguments are rendered
irrelevant because they are beyond the scope of this trial.
Defendant's counsel have confused the facts considerably.
That is -understandable because they are the third firm of
attorneys representing Ms. Baxter in this case.

Furthermore,

they have attempted to reconstruct the case without the advantage of having participated at the trial, nor at any of the
Commission hearings prior to trial.
Defendant-appellant has argued page after page the
doctrine of estoppel and laches.

The doctrine of laches is
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simply barred for failure of timeliness.

Also, the maxim

that "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands"
is an ancient precept of the Equity Court.

In the instant

case, the defendant is seeking this shield of equity without
clean hands, and the relief prayed for should be denied.
Defendant-appellant has ignored the fact that the doctrine
of estoppel is generally not available against a governmental
entity unless the circumstances are exceptional.

The plaintiff

County, vigorously contends that no exceptional circumstances
exist in the instant case which would estop the County from
exercising its inherent police power to protect the health,
safety, and general well-being of the public.
The defendant-appellant has attempted to make complex that
which is very simple.
Defendant-appellant testified or admitted at trial:
1.

That she endorsed the building permit claiming the
intended use was to be residential;

2.

That she filed a site plan with rooms identified
as residential rooms (living room, bedroom, etc.);

3.

That she estimated the remodelling of the home would
be $3500.

She actually spent between $12,000 and

$15,000 (T.R. 44);
4.

That she, in fact, used the home for a commercial
business;
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5.

That she never had a business license to conduct
a business in the home (T.R. 44);

6.

That she intended the commercial use of the home to
be temporary; to be used during the construction
period of the restaurant by her partners (T.R. 50);

7.

That when her partners completed the new steak house,
she intended to transfer the business to the new
structure (T.R. 51);

8.

That upon completion of the same, she experienced
problems with her partners and was unable to transfer
(T.R. 51);

9.

That the problems were not caused by any misleading
on the part of Utah County or its officers, and that
the problems resulted from a partnership breakdown
(T.R. 51).

There is no question that where there once existed one
commercial business, Ms. Baxter and her partners now have two
in that Critical Environmental Zone.

There is no question

that a single-family residence has been converted to a commercial use.
Defendant-appellant continued her commercial use of the
home long past the newly completed construction, and even long
past the trial and the issuance of the injunction.

-17-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Defendant has prayed that the injunction be lifted and
that she be entitled to a permanent commercial use of the
single-family residence.

She is asking this Court to grant

her a permanent commercial use in an already non-conforming
residential building, contrary to the zoning ordinance of Utah
County and contrary to the evidence presented at trial.
Plaintiff respectfully resists that prayer for relief and
requests that this Court affirm the lower Court.
Respectfully submitted this
day of December, 1980.
NOALL T. WOOTTON
Utah County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent

By~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

LYNN W. DAVIS
Deputy County Attorney
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